Politics and the price of rice in Thailand: Public choice, institutional change and rural subsidies by RICKS, Jacob
Singapore Management University
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
Research Collection School of Social Sciences School of Social Sciences
5-2018
Politics and the price of rice in Thailand: Public
choice, institutional change and rural subsidies
Jacob RICKS
Singapore Management University, JACOBRICKS@smu.edu.sg
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/00472336.2017.1419275
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research
Part of the Asian Studies Commons, Political Economy Commons, and the Rural Sociology
Commons
This Journal Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Social Sciences at Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management
University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection School of Social Sciences by an authorized administrator of Institutional
Knowledge at Singapore Management University. For more information, please email libIR@smu.edu.sg.
Citation
RICKS, Jacob.(2018). Politics and the price of rice in Thailand: Public choice, institutional change and rural subsidies. Journal of
Contemporary Asia, 48(3), 395-418.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research/2408
 1 
 
Politics and the Price of Rice in Thailand:  
Public Choice, Institutional Change, and Rural Subsidies 
 
 
 
 
Jacob I. Ricks 
Assistant Professor of Political Science 
School of Social Sciences  
Singapore Management University 
90 Stamford Road, Level 04 
Singapore 178903 
jacobricks@smu.edu.sg  
+65 6808 5460 
 
 
 
***Accepted for publication in Journal of Contemporary Asia on 6 March, 2017*** 
 
 
 
Date: 22 February 2017 
Length: 11,913 (including text, table, endnotes, and references) 
 
 
Abstract:  
 
Despite the Thai state’s long record of rice market interventions, historically Thai politicians 
failed to leverage rice subsidies in their pursuit of political support, notwithstanding the large 
number of farmers in the country. Since Thaksin Shinawatra’s election in 2001, though, each 
government has subsidized rice producers, although at varying degrees. What explains this 
change? In this essay, I trace the four-decade history of rice price support programs. I 
propose that these policies be interpreted through the dual lens of institutionalism and public 
choice theory, demonstrating that electoral rules have shaped incentives of Thai politicians to 
cater to different political constituencies. During the pre-1980 period, under authoritarian 
institutions, Thai leaders applied rice price policies to benefit urban consumers and the 
government. From 1979 through 2000, following implementation of the block-vote system, 
rice interventions were used to appeal to voting intermediaries like rice millers, as bargaining 
chips among competing parties, and as stop-gap measures to diffuse farmer protests. Since 
2001, responding to the electoral system created by the 1997 constitution, politicians have 
appealed directly to the voting public, seeking broad-based support via subsidies. The 
analysis highlights the impact that shifting electoral incentives have on politicians’ actions 
and thus the emergent policies.  
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In 2001, the Thai Rak Thai (TRT) government under Thaksin Shinawatra (2001-2006) began 
offering substantial subsidies to rice farmers through a rice mortgage program known as 
paddy pledging. The policy, launched in 1981, provided farmers a government-sponsored 
loan valued at a predicted market price for their paddy, ostensibly for them to weather 
seasonal market downturns caused by harvest season supply gluts. In theory, once the market 
rebounded, farmers would sell their paddy and repay the loan. Otherwise, they could default 
on the loan, leaving the stocks to the government. Under Thaksin, the program offered 
farmers credit for their crops at close-to or higher-than market value, essentially purchasing 
the pledged paddy. This was hugely popular among rural voters, who became fierce 
supporters of TRT. The Pheu Thai party, TRT’s successor headed by Thaksin’s sister 
Yingluck Shinawatra (2011-2014), enhanced the program, paying farmers up to 150 percent 
of market value for their rice paddy. While this may have won votes, it was also very 
expensive (Nipon and Kamphol 2014, 25-26), and, after the 2014 coup, Yingluck was 
prosecuted for dereliction of duty due to the over 286 billion baht (8.2 billion USD) spent 
purchasing farmers’ paddy (Bangkok Post, August 2, 2016).  
   Despite accusations of populism (Thanapan 2014; Warr 2014) and corruption (Nipon 
et al. 2014), opposing political forces have been loath to abolish rice price supports for 
farmers. Even after decrying the evils of paddy pledging under the Shinawatra clan, the 
military junta was quick to reinstate a similar policy shortly after deposing the Pheu Thai 
government (Edens 2015). The 2006 coup group also kept a reduced version of the program 
intact. Prior to the Yingluck government, the Abhisit Vejjajjiva administration (2009-2011) 
initially shouldered the paddy pledging scheme before substituting a rice insurance subsidy. 
Over the past 15 years in Thailand, then, there has been little question as to whether or not the 
government should intervene to support rice farmers; the debate is instead about degree.  
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 This recent increase in the scope of rice-based subsidies poses a puzzle. Rice price 
supports in Thailand have an almost four-decade history, yet prior to Thaksin’s embrace of 
paddy pledging, there was “a curious failure” of politicians to seek votes by appealing to 
broad-based rural subsidies (Unger and Chandra 2016, 174-175). This despite the large 
proportion of Thais engaged in agriculture, especially rice. Why, then, did heavy intervention 
in rice prices occur when it did?  
 Adopting a political economy perspective based on the public choice theoretical 
approach, I argue that Thailand’s rice subsidy policies have been shaped by the shifting 
importance of specific political constituencies. I do this by tracing and comparing the history 
of rice price interventions across four periods: the authoritarian extraction era (1950s-1970s); 
the block vote system (1979-2000); the rise of Thai Rak Thai (2001-2006); and the time 
between the coups (2007-2014). In each period, rice price policies changed in response to the 
way political institutions channeled the political rents that politicians could capture from 
policy. In short, as electoral rules shifted, so did the payoff for appealing to different political 
constituencies; ergo, politicians strategically shifted policy from an urban bias in the first 
period to targeted projects in the second to finally broad-based appeals. Rice price policies 
were driven by politicians’ efforts to curry favor with specific groups.  
 This theoretical approach fills lacunae in recent works on Thailand’s rice market 
interventions, which have a tendency to highlight the costs of the paddy pledging program 
rather than seeking to understand its political foundations (Nipon 2010; Nipon et al. 2014; 
Nipon and Kamphol 2014; Thanapan 2014). While valuable, these pieces target the “what?” 
and neglect the “why?” of the massive transformation that has taken place in the rice price 
policy environment. When the reasons for the policy shift are discussed, they are described as 
emerging from Thaksin’s populist tendencies and the Shinawatra clan’s penchant for 
corruption. Such explanations have three shortcomings.  
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 First, Thaksin and his successors were unlikely populists (Pasuk and Baker 2008, 63-
68). As a wealthy bureaucrat-turned-businessman-turned-politician, Thaksin exhibited little 
concern for the plight of Thailand’s poor until his term as prime minister (Hewison 2010, 
121-122). Nevertheless, the Shinawatra name has now become almost synonymous with rural 
subsidies and populism (Anek 2006). While there is much to fault about Thaksin, blaming 
him entirely for the rise of broad policy appeals and rural subsidies is perhaps giving him too 
much credit. If, instead, we consider the role of electoral incentives in shaping politician 
behavior, Thaksin is not entirely unique. Seen in this light, his use of redistribution policies to 
appeal to political supporters, while not economically efficient, was entirely logical in respect 
to the electoral context (Hicken 2009, 127-139; Selway 2011, 169-171).  
 Second, critics of the policy have focused on the role of corruption, arguing that the 
Shinawatra clan and others promoted paddy pledging primarily for rent-seeking, especially 
since 2011 (Thai Rath, October 18, 2012; Kamon and Winai 2015, 24). While corruption did 
exist throughout the program, gains were more widely distributed than would be expected if 
the policy were designed merely as a rent-seeking measure. Nipon and Kamphol (2014, 18-
20) estimate that from 2011-2014 “almost all farm households … benefited from the paddy 
pledging policy,” receiving a total 296.5 billion-baht (9.6 billion USD) boost to their paddy 
prices. Even though there was a bias in providing subsidies toward wealthier growers in the 
central plains, farmers from poorer households and regions also profited from the policy. In 
the 2012-2013 main harvest season, 1.42 million farmers of Thailand’s 3.73 million rice-
planting households took part in the program, with 46.4 percent of participants coming from 
the relatively impoverished Northeast and another 12.3 percent residing in the North, both 
areas of major support for Thaksin and his family (OAE, 2013; Nipon et al. 2014, table 1.3). 
If the main objective of the Shinawatra clan was extracting rents from the state, other 
methods have a long history of more directly channeling money into politician hands (see 
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Pasuk and Sungsidh 1994, 33-38). Paddy pledging distributed resources too widely to make it 
a purely rent-seeking affair.    
 Finally, the work cited above focuses primarily on the heavy subsidization period 
under the TRT, People’s Power Party, and Pheu Thai governments. As such, the current 
literature fails to analyze a much longer history of rice market interventions by the Thai state, 
which have been the subject of political wrangling for decades. Neglecting this history in 
favor of Shinawatra-centric explanations limits our ability to understand the forces that 
continue to shape Thailand’s politics today, including both economic and political transitions.   
 On the economic side, the country is experiencing a delayed structural transformation, 
or the reallocation of labor and economic activity from the agricultural sector into industry 
and services. The World Bank reports that as much as 41.6 percent of labor was still engaged 
in agriculture as of 2013, leaving Thailand an outlier at its current level of development; 
comparable countries have far fewer farmers (Klyuev 2015, 9-11).1 With the agricultural 
sector producing only 11.3 percent of GDP in 2013, agricultural incomes are far below their 
urban counterparts. As inequality is closely linked to the country’s current plight (Pasuk and 
Baker 2016, 1-2), understanding the political foundations for policy-making and the potential 
for redistribution is of utmost importance (Walker 2012, 49-56; 2015, 55-58).  
 On the political side, Thailand’s military junta is in the process of adopting a new set 
of political institutions, which they hope will further diminish the influence of the Shinawatra 
family. Attempts to institutionally “force the genie back in the bottle” met with societal 
resistance after 2007 but some preliminary evidence of success (Hicken and Selway 2012, 
77-81). While it is difficult to entirely separate out the effect of institutions from that of 
societal change, the impact of electoral rules on a singular policy arena across four eras 
allows us to take a historical look at the way in which institutions shaped policy outcomes. 
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 This essay thus contributes by pushing the analysis beyond a focus on recent events to 
recognize that Thailand’s rice policies are part of a broader transformation of Thai politics 
embedded in both institutional and societal changes throughout the past four decades. I now 
continue with a brief discussion of the theoretical foundations of the essay. Afterwards I 
recount the policy history of rice market interventions across each of the four periods outlined 
above, highlighting the impact of political institutions. I then conclude the essay by 
considering the implications of this argument.  
 
Public Choice, Political Institutions, and Paddy Prices 
 
The literature on the political economy of agricultural policy has a long history contrasting 
demands of rural and urban sectors (Ammar 1975; Bates 1981; Hayami 1972; Lipton 1977). 
These approaches see policy as the outcome of competition over access to state resources by 
societal groups, mediated by politicians (Dunleavy 1991, 2-4). In brief, society is composed 
of multiple interest groups that can serve as potential political constituencies. Self-interested 
politicians seek to extend their power by using the arms of the government and access to 
goods to appeal to these constituencies (Grindle and Thomas 1991, 24-27). In this 
perspective, public policy emerges as a calculated response by political officials to the 
demands of the most relevant interest groups in society; strong political rationales overpower 
concerns of economic efficiency. Such logic is the basis for important work on urban bias 
(Bates 1981) as well as explanations for rural subsidies (Bates and Block 2013; Pierskalla 
2015; Varshney 1995).  
 This public choice approach is a fruitful lens for considering the evolution of 
Thailand’s policies for rice price interventions. At the same time, though, public choice 
theory is potentially weak in that it fails to explain how interest groups and their power 
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dynamics change over time (Pepinsky 2014, 79-81). Here we can draw assistance from the 
literature on political institutions, especially in reference to how institutions shape which 
interest groups or constituencies provide benefits to politicians. In other words, institutional 
rules determine the relevance of specific political constituencies (Ammar 2001, 268-270).  
 Consequently, certain institutions favor specific policy outcomes. Urban biases often 
exist under authoritarian institutions wherein rural constituencies have little value, as the 
ruling coalition is more sensitive to lobbying from industry as well as the threat of protests in 
the capital (Bates 1981, 30-35). In contrast, in democracies a large rural constituency can 
emerge as a critical source of political support (Bates and Block 2013; Hayami 1972, 2007; 
Varshney 1995). Democratic regimes vary, though, in their provision of policy goods 
dependent on the way their institutions channel citizen demand; in systems with single-
member districts abiding plurality electoral rules, goods tend to be targeted to specific 
constituencies, while proportional representation systems gravitate toward public goods 
provision or broader policy appeals (Rausser and Roland 2016, 114-118; Selway 2015, 55-
58).  
 Combining a public choice approach with institutional considerations, I contend that 
rice price policies in Thailand have been driven by political efforts to appeal to relevant 
constituencies. These groups, though, have varying levels of import to the political sphere 
based on the electoral rules that existed throughout Thailand’s history. To summarize briefly, 
from the post-war era until the late 1970s, Thailand’s authoritarian nature did not allow rural 
interests to influence policy; urban concerns, therefore, dominated rice price policies. From 
the implementation of the block voting system in 1979 through 1997, rural populations were 
able to gain greater representation, but their access was constrained by the fragmented nature 
of the political system. Politicians seeking cabinet portfolios strategically exploited farmer 
protests to achieve targeted spending. In addition, rice millers and collectors became a vital 
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link between politicians and their rural constituents, thus rice price subsidies were nominally 
developed to promote farmer welfare, but primarily through the medium of rice mills. 
Politicians, therefore, pursued rice policies which achieved three goals: (1) access state 
resources via cabinet portfolios; (2) benefit rice millers and traders who were central to 
electoral contests; and (3) diffuse sporadic farmer protests. After the 1997 constitution was 
implemented, though, the importance of small parties and voting intermediaries like rice 
millers diminished. Instead direct links between voters and a national party system reshaped 
rice policies, prompting politicians to consolidate political support by creating broad-based 
policy appeals. Finally, following the coup of 2006, military and unelected elites attempted to 
reinstate the 1979-1997 system of political rule; society and politicians, though, had changed 
(Hewison 2010; Hicken and Selway 2012, 58). In an effort to overcome the institutional 
constraints and maintain political dominance in spite of the changes, politicians embellished 
their broad appeals.   
 I develop this argument by using a variant of process tracing, whereby I seek an 
explanation for a singular outcome rather than develop and test a broadly generalizable 
theory (Beach and Pedersen 2013, 18-21). As such, my research was conducted in an iterative 
and inductive manner. Beginning with theoretical expectations embedded in the intersection 
of historical and rational choice institutionalism that politician behavior and thus policy 
outputs are shaped by political institutions (Thelen, 1999, 374-377), I developed a timeline of 
rice price interventions based on newspaper archives, cabinet resolutions, and secondary 
English-language sources. These were organized into the four periods identified above 
according to broad institutional shifts in Thai politics. Additional work was then completed in 
Thailand to access Thai-language library materials and data sources unavailable overseas. I 
also conducted several semi-structured interviews with individuals and researchers involved 
with rice policy. Data collection took place from mid-2015 through mid-2016.  
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 Throughout the research process, I fine-tuned my expectations regarding the politics 
of rice policy interventions. As the process was not one of pure theory-testing, I instead relied 
on tying together threads of evidence into an empirical narrative detailing the causes behind 
rice price policy interventions. By comparing government actions across different time 
periods, I illustrate how institutional changes have affected the Thai government’s attempts to 
shape the rice market, evolving from a system of extraction to one of extensive subsidization. 
Because of the approach, the narrative is somewhat unique to Thailand. In the conclusion, 
though, I will briefly discuss the paper’s implications for institutionalist theory.  
 
Thai Rice Price Interventions  
 
Figure 1 provides an overview of the effect of the Thai state’s interventions in rice markets. 
From this data we can draw a few important insights regarding rice price policies. 
 First, it is clear that prior to 1981, domestic rice prices were significantly lower than 
world market prices. Also, with the exception of 1972, farm gate prices hovered far below 
wholesale domestic prices. In other words, this was an era of clear extraction. Second, 
between 1981 and 1982, the disparity between export and domestic prices shrank 
dramatically, in part due to a global drop in rice prices. Prior global price declines had been 
matched by domestic price devaluation. In this year, though, the nominal rate of protection 
experienced by the Thai market changed from negative 35 percent to approximately negative 
13 percent. In the 35 years since, export and domestic values have not diverged by more than 
14 percent, meaning that domestic prices were finally allowed to approach export prices, 
although domestic wholesale prices remain somewhat lower than the international market. 
Third, the remuneration farmers extract from the market has also grown closer to wholesale 
and export values, although for the most part this is due to decreases in market values rather 
 10 
 
than higher prices for farmers’ harvests. Fourth, in terms of real prices, rice today is sold at 
about the same value as in the early 1980s, reflecting the long-term trend that, with the 
exception of the 2008 world food crisis, the price of grains continues to decrease. The 
corollary is that in order to increase income by producing rice, Thai farmers must produce 
more grain than in the past or move from low-value grains toward higher-value. 
 With this in mind, I turn to each of the policy periods discussed above.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Thai Rice Prices and Nominal Rates of Protection, 1970-2015 
Source: Data from Office of Agricultural Economics, Department of Internal Trade, World Bank Pinksheet, 
FAO, and USDA. Farm gate prices until 2005 exclude rice that entered the Paddy Mortgage Program. Numbers 
are based on the value of one ton of paddy used to produce 5% White Rice, calculated with a conversion rate of 
0.66 as reported in Boonjit (2012, 14). Nominal Rate of Protection is calculated as [(Domestic Wholesale – 
Export Value)/Export Value] following Warr and Archanun (2007, Figure 1).   
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Authoritarian Extraction (1950s-1970s) 
 
Beginning in the post-war era through the 1970s, the Thai government was not kind to 
farmers. Thailand’s political institutions during this time, with the brief exception of 1973-
1976, were authoritarian, under the direct control of military leaders. Policy-making was 
generally the purview of bureaucrats, who were largely insulated from societal forces thanks 
to the role of the military in governance (Riggs 1966). The governing elite focused on 
perpetuating military rule, achieving economic development in line with state goals, as well 
as appeasing their coalition supporters, including urban bureaucrats and the rice exporting 
industry (Christensen 1993, 192-197). Key to achieving these objectives was financing the 
government, obtaining foreign capital, and maintaining a cheap labor force (Pasuk and Baker 
2002, 132-133). Government targets in rice policy privileged revenue and foreign exchange 
generation as well as providing modest prices for consumers (Ammar 1975, 236-241); policy 
decisions were made accordingly.  
Export taxes were the primary policy tool for accumulating government revenue. 
Extractive policies via export controls emerged following the government’s discovery that 
rice exports were a ready source of revenue in the aftermath of World War Two. The main 
tax, referred to as the rice premium, required that exporters obtain licenses from the 
government in order to ship their goods; additionally, they were obliged to pay a hefty export 
duty on each ton of rice shipped. The combined cost of government levies on rice exports 
amounted to one-third of export prices in the 1950s (Ammar and Suthad 1989, 29-31). 
During that decade rice export taxes contributed as much as 32 percent of government 
revenue, and, although this proportion decreased over time, the rice premium remained an 
important source of funding until the 1970s (Ammar 1975, 242). Partly as a consequence of 
the taxes, exporters developed strong links with the Commerce Ministry, allowing them to 
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transmit the cost of the taxes to millers and farmers, thus draining money away from the 
countryside to support urban development (Christensen 1993, 197-198).  
Military rulers were also concerned about the availability of cheap rice for urban 
consumers, especially government bureaucrats who were sensitive to commodity price 
fluctuations. Export taxes assisted in this effort by reducing the proportion of the cereal that 
left the country, depressing local prices. In addition, in the 1960s, the government adopted a 
rice reserve requirement as a consumption subsidy for urbanites (Ammar and Suthad 1989, 
31-37). This program combined with the work of the Public Warehouse Organization (PWO) 
to supply cheap rice for cities (FAO 1985, 77). Although the amount of rice involved as well 
as its effect was rather limited, it did impact the availability of goods for Bangkok consumers. 
It also signaled the importance authoritarian governments attached to subsidizing the city.  
The pursuit of government revenue and cheap rice for Bangkok had multiple negative 
consequences for the rural sector. High taxes on agricultural products discouraged investment 
in large-scale rice production, hindering efforts that might have emerged for rural 
productivity increases (Christensen 1993, 213-215). This, in turn, delayed agricultural 
transformation, leaving a large proportion of the population impoverished in rural areas 
(Ingram 1971, 279). Initial shifts in agricultural policy during the late 1960s and early 1970s 
to provide limited price supports for rice farmers were aimed at addressing this disparity, but 
the subsidy level was below market price and the rice premium persisted, extracting money 
from the countryside. In sum, prior to the 1970s, rice price policies were primarily aimed to 
produce government revenue, obtain foreign exchange, and benefit urban rice consumers 
(Ammar 1975, 246-247). 
 These concerns began to shift dramatically after the democratic transition in 1973. 
Farmers rose to a position of political influence, and politicians wasted little time in turning 
their attention to rural needs. When inflation took its toll on consumers in 1974, the 
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government chose to break with the past and not curtail exports, allowing rising prices to 
trickle down to farmers (Ammar 1975, 242). In the same year, the Farmer’s Aid Fund was 
established, and the Marketing Organization for Farmers (MOF) of the Ministry of 
Agriculture used the money to intervene in domestic rice policy for the first time (Choeun, 
Godo, and Hayami 2006, 107). 80 percent of the revenues from the rice premium were to be 
directed into price support programs for poor farmers (Morell and Chai-Anan 1981, 220).  
 These policies were a response to the eruption of mass protests throughout 1974 by 
farmer groups demanding greater government attention. Demonstrations at Sanam Luang at 
the heart of Bangkok occurred in March, June, August, and November, eventually 
contributing to the founding of the Farmer’s Federation of Thailand (FFT), which rapidly 
grew (Haberkorn 2011, Ch. 2; Morell and Chai-Anan 1981, Ch. 8). Politicians saw farmer 
dissatisfaction and mobilization as a potential crisis, especially as they linked the farmer 
movement with the threat of Communist insurgencies, and the government responded with 
forays into rural subsidies.  
 The focus on farmers did not last. When Thailand reverted to military dictatorship in 
1976, farmer organizations, especially the FFT, were targeted as potential threats to the 
country. Even before the coup, professional assassins had killed many farmer leaders. The 
murders continued as the military reestablished its hold on Thai politics (Haberkorn 2011, 
106; Morell and Chai-Anan 1981, 228). Despite this, the ruling junta did recognize the role 
that farm subsidies could play in diffusing rural unrest and placating potential threats to their 
power. The Farmer’s Aid Fund persisted, providing rice price supports from 1975 through 
1982 via the MOF. This form of price support, though, allowed for a great deal of corruption 
and graft, with only a fraction of funds reaching farmer hands (Ammar and Suthad 1989, 37-
42).  
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 Thus the authoritarian political institutions during this first period, despite farmer 
gains from 1973-1976, targeted policy toward Bangkok. Urban residents as well as export 
firms desired cheap domestic rice, which aligned with military interests. The state also relied 
on revenue from the rural sector, and the government, as public choice theory would predict, 
extracted from farmers to benefit these interests. 
 
Block Votes and Targeted Policies (1979-2000) 
 
At the end of the 1970s, Thailand underwent a transformation. The military, although not 
completely ceding authority, began a power-sharing relationship with an elected parliament 
under the premiership of General Prem Tinsulanonda (1980-1988). The 1978 constitution and 
the ensuing transition to semi-democracy changed the impact of societal demands on the Thai 
state, especially through the medium of a block vote system of electoral rules dividing 
provinces into multi-member electoral districts, which was in place from 1979 through 1996. 
The effects of this block vote system have been detailed by Hicken (2009, chapters 4-5) and 
Selway (2015, 95-99), but suffice it to say that the rules encouraged Thai politicians to create 
individual constituencies rather than coherent parties. In doing so politicians were forced to 
construct independent power bases among voters, requiring that they rely on local networks 
and factions rather than mass-based parties (Kuhonta 2011, 167-171; McCargo 1997, 118-
121; Ockey 2004, Ch. 2). Among the most important individuals for developing local 
political networks were the owners and operators of rice mills. Due to their prominence and 
close contact with farmers, rice millers and collectors frequently acted as vote canvassers in 
their communities, allowing them special access to members of parliament (Ammar 2001, 
253).  
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 In addition to the rise of local interests, Thailand’s ephemeral political parties, based 
on personalities and factions, became engaged in sharp competition over cabinet portfolios. A 
cabinet seat granted access to goods, services, contracts, and rents that became the mainstay 
of Thai politics during this period. Politicians focused on being assigned to important 
ministries, and coalitions frequently fell to pieces owing to dissatisfaction over cabinet 
assignments. Among the most important of these were the Commerce and Agriculture 
portfolios, which commanded government rice purchases via the PWO and MOF, 
respectively (Christensen 1993, 236-241).  Control of these ministries ensured access to 
government resources and the ability to channel funds toward important rice millers as well 
as ensure spending was targeted toward ones’ constituency.  
 Elected parliamentarians, taking part in fluid coalitions, also began to take notice of 
farmer demands, especially when rural groups mobilized to protest. Frequently, disgruntled 
members of parliament who had been overlooked in the assignment of cabinet seats benefited 
from mobilizing farmers in order to destabilize coalitions, as discussed below.  
 Thus rice price policies from the early 1980s through 2000 evidenced repeated 
attempts by the government to win over each of these support groups: rice millers, party 
factions, and protesting farmers. The change was evident as early as 1981, when the 
government shrank the rice reserve program, completely dismissing it in 1982. It also sharply 
reduced the rice premium to only $17.47 per ton of 100 percent white rice by October 1981, 
approximately half the previous year’s rate and only a fraction of the 1974 high of $250/ton 
(FAO 1985, 81-82). In the same year, both the Democrat and Chart Thai parties embraced the 
price support scheme begun in 1975, and their respective cabinet portfolios, Commerce and 
Agriculture, took advantage of government resources through expanded rice purchases 
(Christensen 1993, 236-241). At the same time, during the 1981-1982 rice harvest season, the 
government introduced the paddy pledging policy, allowing farmers to mortgage their newly 
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harvested rice at the Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives (BAAC) for 80 
percent of its value. The policy was far from popular. Initial loan terms were steep with an 
interest rate of 13 percent, and in the first year only 69 farmers joined the program (Nipon 
and Jitrakan 2010, 9); less than 1 percent of total rice produced entered the scheme between 
1981 and 1985 (see Table 1).  
 These early changes greatly reduced the Thai state’s extraction of rents from rice, and 
the nominal rate of protection increased from -35 percent in 1981 to -13 percent in 1982 (see 
Figure 1). Most of the benefits of these interventions, though, did not accrue to farmers. 
Government agencies tasked with administering the programs were relatively understaffed, 
and they relied heavily on rice millers and traders for implementation, who exploited the 
policies (Ammar and Suthad 1989, 40-41). Jermsak (1984, 178) found that in the MOF paddy 
purchasing program, millers absorbed 25.31 percent of the program’s benefits, exporters took 
in another 28.44 percent, and political parties and bureaucrats received 26.75 percent, leaving 
less than 20 percent of the money for farmers and farmer leaders. 
 Over the next decade, policies continued along similar lines, although farmer voices 
became more prominent thanks to repeated protests, often organized or at least partially 
directed by members of parliament (CIA 1985). For instance, in the 1985/1986 main harvest 
season, farmer protests led by members of parliament from a faction of the Social Action 
Party and the Chart Thai Party resulted in the resignation of Kosol Krairiksh, the Minister of 
Commerce from the Social Action Party, triggering a cabinet reshuffle (Aphichai and Montri 
1988, 50-55; Paisal 1986).  
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Table 1: Paddy Production and Amount of Paddy Pledged, 1981-2014 
 Main Season Crop Second Season Crop 
Harvest 
Year 
Paddy 
Produced 
(million 
tons) 
Paddy 
Pledged 
(million 
tons) 
Proportion 
of Paddy 
Pledged 
(per cent) 
Paddy 
Produced 
(million 
tons) 
Paddy 
Pledged 
(million 
tons) 
Proportion 
of Paddy 
Pledged 
(per cent) 
1981-82 15.76 0.00041 0.003 2.02   
1982-83 14.77 0.0015 0.01 2.1   
1983-84 16.94 0.00024 0.001 2.61   
1984-85 17.27 0.090 0.52 2.63   
1985-86 17.93   2.33   
1986-87 16.83 2.28 13.52 2.04   
1987-88 15.27 0.35 2.29 2.77   
1988-89 17.88 0.52 2.89 3.38   
1989-90 18.48 1.08 5.85 2.12   
1990-91 14.9 0.80 5.36 2.29   
1991-92 17.52 1.06 6.05 2.88   
1992-93 17.3 3.38 19.56 2.62   
1993-94 16.48 1.20 7.30 1.96   
1994-95 18.16 1.40 7.73 2.95   
1995-96 17.73 1.18 6.67 4.29   
1996-97 17.78 0.87 4.87 4.55   
1997-98 18.79 0.79 4.19 4.79   
1998-99 18.66 0.68 3.63 4.34   
1999-00 19.02 0.70 3.67 5.16   
2000-01 19.79 1.62 8.18 6.06 0.5 8.26 
2001-02 22.41 4.30 19.18 5.62 1.84 32.72 
2002-03 21.57 3.59 16.63 6.43 2.04 31.75 
2003-04 23.42 2.54 10.84 6.41 0.86 13.42 
2004-05 22.92 8.65 37.75 5.95 0.8 13.43 
2005-06 23.82 5.25 22.03 6.83 2.17 31.76 
2006-07 23.11 1.29 5.56 6.88 1.64 23.83 
2007-08 23.58 0.24 1.02 8.89 3.93 44.19 
2008-09 23.51 5.35 22.76 8.51 5.32 62.45 
2009-10 23.43   8.97   
2010-11 25.74   10.26   
2011-12 25.87 4.11 15.90 12.24 14.532 118.71 
2012-13 27.23 14.50 53.24 10.77 7.98 74.09 
2013-14 27.09 11.67 43.08 9.67   
Source: Nipon and Jitrakan 2010, Table 2.2; Office of Agricultural Economics; Department 
of Internal Trade 
 
 
This political pressure spurred the Prem administration to establish the Rice Policy 
Committee, provide paddy price guarantees, reduce the interest rates of the paddy mortgage 
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scheme to between 3 and 6 percent, and completely abolish the rice premium. The 
government also set aside 5 billion baht for the 1986/1987 paddy mortgage program (Narong 
2005, Ch. 1). Farmers quickly took advantage of the new paddy pledging rates, and 2.28 
million tons of rice, or 13.5 percent of the year’s harvest, entered into the program (Table 1). 
By the end of 1986, with these policies in place, as well as the Rural Development Fund 
(established in 1984) providing targeted projects to rural areas, the Thai government had 
largely eliminated its urban bias. It was now committed to providing targeted subsidies for 
rural areas, at least on the surface. 
 Unfortunately for farmers, most of the benefits of government policies continued to 
find their way into the hands of politicians, rice millers and collectors, exporters, and 
bureaucrats. When Prem left office and was replaced by the elected Chatichai Choonhavan 
(1988-1991), the government meddled in rice markets “to maintain paddy prices at last year’s 
levels to avoid them becoming a political issue” despite falling international prices (Bangkok 
Post, October 30, 1989). Interventions included 11.83 billion baht spread across twelve rice 
price support programs, with 5 billion baht to support rice millers and traders as well as 1 
billion for direct purchases from exporters that the Commerce Ministry would then export 
(Bangkok Post, November 4, 1989). As the government purchased more rice, it needed more 
storage, which it rented from millers, providing them additional income. In other words, the 
Chatichai “buffet cabinet” was disseminating resources, allowing politicians to target millers 
and, to a lesser extent, exporters.  
These policies, though, failed to arrest the downward trend of rice prices in the early 
1990s. Millers’ rice barns were full, limiting their ability to purchase new rice. The 
government was forced to sell its stocks at a loss. Approximately 15 percent of paddy 
mortgage loans also fell into default in 1990, leaving the government with even higher stocks 
of rice and rising costs (Bangkok Post, October 1, 1990; Bangkok Post, October 24, 1990). 
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Despite the expense, in 1991 the government expanded the paddy mortgage program to 90 
percent of the crop’s value and offered zero percent interest rates (Christensen 1993, 247). 
Additional interventions, such as rice purchases and cheap credit, were processed via rice 
millers, leading prominent agricultural economist Jermsak Pinthong to declare that 
government rice price supports were “designed for political gain only” (Bangkok Post, 
October 1, 1990).  
  Following the 1991 coup and its aftermath, rice price policies continued along similar 
lines: The state provided cheap credit for rice millers; the BAAC mortgaged paddy for 
farmers at 90 percent of the government-set target price; the Ministry of Commerce via the 
PWO, Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives via the MOF, and Ministry of Interior all 
bought rice directly from farmers; and the Ministry of Commerce bought rice from exporters. 
By the premiership of Banharn Silpa-archa in 1995, the budget for rice market interventions 
reached almost 40 billion baht (1.61 billion USD), with most of the money (35 billion baht) 
directed to low-interest loans for millers and exporters (Bangkok Post, November 2, 1995). 
The paddy pledging program had also been expanded to cover 2.5 million tons of rice. 
Technocrats challenged these policies; one BAAC official complained in reference to the 
paddy mortgage scheme, “This isn’t the public welfare department” (Bangkok Post, January 
8, 1993). Politics, though, trumped economic concerns.  
Spending on rice price interventions had become a political pie shared among the 
various cabinet portfolios; with multiple parties in each cabinet, the disbursement of cash was 
necessary to appease members of fragile coalitions. Primarily the measures were conducted 
through rice millers rather than in direct contact between the state and farmers. Indeed, in 
1993 Niphon Wontra-ngarn, the president of the Rice Millers’ Association was appointed to 
head the MOF, indicating the degree of influence millers had during this period.3 Rice millers 
clearly benefited from rice price interventions, and the number of rice milling firms registered 
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with the Ministry of Industry increased from 34,414 to 43,305 between 1987 and 1996 
(Boonjit 2008, 251-252). Exporters, in contrast, recognized the danger of relying solely on 
government supports and chose to diversify into other industries to reduce their risk portfolio 
(interview, Thai Rice Exporters Association President, October 7, 2015). 
 When the financial crisis hit in July 1997, government interventions in rice markets 
continued, despite a temporary increase in the international competitiveness of Thai rice due 
to the currency devaluation. Only 786,000 tons of paddy entered the mortgage scheme in 
1997/1998 season, a far cry from the government’s plan to support 2.5 million tons. A new 
issue was emerging, though, which spelled trouble for Thailand’s rice market. Millers had 
become dependent on cheap loans and government subsidies, but the financial crisis had 
severely limited their access to credit. Almost 40 percent of millers went into liquidation 
from 1997 through 1999 (Bangkok Post, November 8, 1999), and 4,352 milling firms 
disappeared from Ministry of Industry records between 1996 and 2001, a decrease of 
approximately 10 percent (Boonjit 2008, 251-252). Without government support, rice mills 
would not be able to purchase new paddy. In late 1998, the Chuan Leekpai government 
instructed the Bank of Thailand to provide soft loans to millers to the tune of 20 billion baht 
in an effort to stave off falling rice prices (Bangkok Post, November 27, 1998).  
This challenge combined with a new glut of rice production, driven by farmers’ 
response to the high prices of the 1997/1998 harvest year. In 1999, Chuan faced farmer 
protests over falling rice prices. The government responded with a slew of support measures, 
including two 3.5-billion-baht budgets for PWO and MOF to purchase rice from millers, 
who, in turn, were to purchase more rice from farmers (Secretariat of the Cabinet, February 2, 
1999; November 16, 1999). The paddy mortgage program rate was raised from 90 to 95 
percent of the target value, placing the guaranteed price farmers would receive for white rice 
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paddy at 5,280 baht/ton (Bangkok Post, November 8, 1999). Most farmers, though, did not 
receive the government target price, as millers discounted their paddy.  
 Reflecting a long-held pattern, disgruntled politicians led farmer protests against the 
government, including a protest in April, 2000 wherein farmers led by MP Chalong 
Riewraeng blocked a major road in Pathum Thani (Bangkok Post, April 6, 2000). Chalong 
had been one of the 12 “Cobra faction” MPs whose support allowed Chuan to take the 
premiership.   
 Chuan struggled to manage coalitional pressures, demands of rice millers, and farmer 
discontent. The PWO and MOF were ordered to purchase more rice from millers to spur price 
increases and “defuse protests by farmers in many provinces” (Bangkok Post, March 29, 
2000). These programs, though, were under heavy criticism, as corruption was endemic. 
Millers were paying farmers 20 percent below than the government guaranteed price, and 
during one investigation, an MP from the opposition New Aspiration Party claimed, “the 7 
billion baht scheme was tainted with irregularities and might not have benefited farmers at 
all… corruption could have cost the state as much as 5 billion baht” (Bangkok Post, June 18, 
1999). 
With the 2001 election approaching, the Democrat-led government announced a new 
plan to spend 64 billion baht to support rice prices, with 40 billion going to millers and 
exporters and another 19.5 billion earmarked for rice purchases to boost prices (Bangkok 
Post, November 21, 2000). Much of the remaining budget was for the BAAC’s paddy 
pledging program.  
In sum, rice market interventions during this second period included paddy 
purchasing schemes via government agencies, the paddy pledging program, cheap credit for 
millers and exporters, and government-driven efforts to purchase and export rice. The stated 
goal of these policies was to promote farmer welfare, but the real beneficiaries were the 
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parties controlling the Commerce and Agriculture portfolios who determined rice purchases, 
millers who gained access to cheap credit along with money derived from storing and milling 
the government-purchased rice, and, to a lesser extent, rice exporters who enjoyed subsidies 
and supports until the mid-1990s. Incentives created by the block vote system and resulting 
weak party system, then, drove politicians to craft policies which (1) distributed rents to 
coalition members; (2) favored rice millers; and (3) diffused sporadic farmer protests. In 
other words, targeted spending rather than broad policy platforms. 
 
The Rise of Thai Rak Thai and Paddy Pledging (2001-2006) 
 
On 6 January, 2001, Thai politics changed again. The new electoral rules based on the 1997 
constitution bore fruit, narrowing the political field and boosting the power of large parties. 
Of the 500 parliamentary seats, 400 were now assigned to single-member constituencies 
abiding plurality rules. The remaining 100 seats were divided proportionally according to 
each party’s vote share in the national pool. This arrangement encouraged the concentration 
of political parties (Hicken 2009, 127-129). What emerged was a much more stable party 
system, wherein broad coalition governments would no longer be necessary. One other side-
effect of these electoral rules was a new set of incentives for politicians, pushing them from 
local, personalistic, clientele-based campaigns toward more programmatic policy 
prescriptions (Selway 2011, 174-180; 2015, 100-102). While there were still vestiges of the 
old system, such as the Chidchob clan in Burriram and Banharn’s Suphanburi (Prajak 2016; 
Nishizaki 2014), the transition spelled major changes for the coming years. Policy platforms 
and broad-based party concerns now overshadowed narrow, constituency-based interests.  
 By far, the beneficiary of these changes was Thaksin Shinawatra and his TRT party. 
Winning 248 seats in the parliament, the party was easily able to form a ruling coalition, and 
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when it collected 36 more seats by absorbing the New Aspiration Party, that dominance only 
increased. The concentration of political power rankled the government’s sole coalition 
partner, Chart Thai, the party of former PM Banharn Silpa-archa, which had a long history of 
dominating certain government portfolios, especially the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Cooperatives. Now, though, Chart Thai was relegated to the less-desirable ministries of 
Science and Labor. As members of Chart Thai turned to the old strategy of threatening to 
mobilize farmer protests, their actions were countered by a firm rebuke from Adisorn 
Piangket, a TRT leader, “I would like to ask [Chart Thai] whether they want to withdraw 
from government” (Bangkok Post, April 23, 2001). The power of small parties to extract 
government concessions was no more. 
Rice pricing policies became an opportunity to directly link the TRT party with its 
rural constituency. In January 2001, TRT quickly turned on the previous government’s rice 
purchasing policies in an effort to assure its rural base that the government was now ready to 
help them. Thaksin publicly announced, “We want farmers to benefit from our farm produce 
price intervention program. Working systems must be checked. I know farmers have seldom 
benefited in the past” (Bangkok Post, April 1, 2001). Corruption investigations were initiated 
on the government purchasing schemes with police raids on rice mills to check stocks and 
their books. Millers complained about their treatment, threatening to quit cooperating with 
the government (Bangkok Post, April 3, 2001); the threats were hollow, as mills had become 
dependent on cheap credit and income from renting storage space. Government subsidies 
were as necessary for millers as farmers, perhaps even more so, and many found themselves 
at the mercy of the government.  
TRT quickly embraced its largely agricultural base (Pasuk and Baker 2008, 70-73). 
Here the paddy mortgage program became useful, both for its familiarity and visibility. For 
the first time, paddy pledging was expanded to cover the second-season rice crop harvested 
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from April through June. This provided direct benefits to farmers in irrigated areas, especially 
in the lower north (Nipon and Kamphol 2014, 17-22). Beyond this expansion, TRT raised the 
loan rate to a full 100 percent of the value of the paddy; an increase from the 95 percent 
offered by the previous Democrat government. The main difference, though, came in the 
calculation of the target value of the paddy. Rather than be based on a projection of market 
value, the government determined the value of paddy mortgages based on investment costs as 
well as a 30 percent mark-up based on capital costs (Nipon 2010, 194; Bangkok Post, April 
23, 2001). In other words, the paddy pledging scheme had now included a guaranteed profit 
for farmers (BAAC 2011, 12-13). During the initial implementation of the program for the 
off-season paddy in May 2001, the government offered 4,300 baht/ton for low-grade, 25-
percent moisture paddy while the market price ranged between 3,600-3,800 baht/ton.  
 The paddy pledging program became well-entrenched in the TRT policy platform, 
and its political benefits accrued directly to the party rather than individual politicians or 
minority parties. For the 2001/2002 main season, the government raised the amount of paddy 
eligible for mortgaging from 2.5 million tons to 8.7 million tons, or approximately one-third 
of that year’s production and one-half of paddy on the market (Secretariat of the Cabinet, 
February 18, 2002). 2003 would see that number reach 9 million tons, a figure that would 
remain constant until 2006 (Secretariat of the Cabinet, June 24, 2003). The paddy pledging 
target price remained at a calculation of inputs plus capital costs until the 2004/2005 harvest 
season (Nipon 2010, 192-194). With an election looming, Thaksin aimed to cement his 
dominance at the polls, and he raised the target price even higher, now promising prices of at 
least 20 to 30 percent above market value, giving farmers strong incentives to pledge their 
rice and abandon it in government hands. These actions made the Thai state the largest 
purchaser of rice in the country, with 37.75 percent of the 2004/2005 main season crop 
entering the program (Table 1).  
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 The scope of rice price supports expanded into other areas as well. The government 
announced a five-year national strategic rice plan (2002-2006), which budgeted 90 billion 
baht to promote higher rice prices, including over 42 billion dedicated to price stabilization, 
35 billion for infrastructure development, and 12 billion for research and development 
(Nalinrat 2002). This was later met with a Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives five-year 
plan for improvements in the production of rice. By 2005, the government claimed that the 
paddy pledging program was a “great success (prasob pholsamret yang di ying)” (Secretariat 
of the Cabinet, February 15, 2005). Promises were issued that farmer livelihoods would 
continue to improve.  
 Exporters complained that domestic prices were too high; with Vietnamese rice 
becoming increasingly competitive, Thai rice was losing ground. Their complaints fell on 
deaf ears. Millers, on the other hand, were now largely dependent on government subsidies. 
The build-up of the milling industry had left Thailand with overcapacity, and competition 
between millers for access to paddy and loans was fierce (Boonjit 2012, 11-12); without the 
paddy pledging policy and the additional rents they received from storing and milling paddy 
many of them could not survive on the market (interview, Rice Miller, Khon Kaen, Oct 21, 
2015). While involved with the paddy pledging scheme, though, millers were frequently 
involved in corrupt practices, such as taking advantage of farmers, reselling mortgaged rice to 
the government, and selling high quality rice while retaining low quality paddy to fill 
government commitments (Nipon and Jitarakan 2010, 60-62).  
 Despite the complaints of exporters and the corruption of millers, the rural 
countryside perceived that the TRT policies had added to their prosperity. While urban 
protests challenged Thaksin in the cities, his rural supporters and their relatives gave him an 
overwhelming electoral mandate in the 2005 and 2006 elections.  
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 When the Thai military staged its first coup in 15 years in September, 2006, it also 
brought an end to the inflated paddy pledging prices. The government soon cut the BAAC 
budget in half to only 20 billion baht for the 2006/2007 season. Target prices were also cut, 
as the government sought to clear its accumulated 4 million-ton rice stockpile. The army 
launched an investigation into the program, claiming that the TRT government’s actions had 
cost Thailand over 18 billion baht in losses (Bangkok Post, October 27, 2006).  
 Thus the policy structure under Thaksin evidenced a major shift from the previous 
two periods. While government resources were still divided among cabinet portfolios, 
atomized control over rice purchases by small parties was at an end. Instead, the paddy 
pledging program took center stage, and with higher guaranteed prices for rice, the scheme 
became the single most important policy tool for the Thaksin government to influence the 
rice market. More importantly, it directly linked the TRT party to higher paddy prices in the 
minds of voters. While policies still operated through millers, mills became subject to greater 
political oversight and investigation. At the same time, politically connected mills enjoyed 
special access to government money (interview, Nipon Poapongsakorn, October 5, 2015). 
Exporters, on the other hand, had lost much of their former influence. The president of the 
Thai Rice Exporters Association explained (interview, October 7, 2015):  
Politicians are looking for votes. Farmers represent the majority of the votes. No 
matter how much [politicians] love us. We are good friends with all the politicians… 
before elections they visit us and talk to us about what they should do. But 12 million 
votes are from farmers. We only have what, 200 votes!  
Rice farming households, composing a large portion of Thai society, became the largest and 
most important political constituency. Thaksin, recognizing the shift in politics that had been 
created by reforming the electoral system, appealed directly to farmers to consolidate his 
political dominance. 
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Institutional Engineering and Expanding Subsidies (2007-2014) 
 
The years following the fall of Thaksin saw wide fluctuations in rice price policies. The 2007 
constitution reinstated block vote electoral rules, only to revert to similar rules to the 1997 
constitution for the 2011 election (Hicken 2013, 206-209). The brief attempt to turn back the 
clock did return some vestiges of the past. For instance, Abhisit Vejjajjiva (2009-2011) 
headed a weak coalition, which allowed the relatively small Bhumjai Thai party to extract 
important cabinet portfolios from the ruling Democrats. These were used to target goods 
toward Bhumjai Thai’s home constituencies, similar to the coalitions prior to 1997 (Prajak 
2016, 13-15). At the same time, Thai society had changed, limiting the effect of the 
institutional shift (Hewison 2010).  This was clear in the 2007 and 2011 elections wherein 
Thais exhibited partisan identities, and many voters in rural areas associated goods provision 
directly with the Pheu Thai party (Hicken 2013, 209-211; Hicken and Selway 2012, 73-75). 
Thus there was a tension between institutions and societal pressures, which was in evidence 
in vacillating rice policies.  
 Throughout 2007, re-empowered bureaucrats in the appointed Surayud Chulanont 
government reformed the government’s rice policies, including a moratorium on buying rice, 
a ten-year plan to manage production, and a reduction in the role of millers in rice price 
support policies. As Thailand transitioned back to democracy in early 2008, government 
interventions in the rice market had been greatly reduced; this was short-lived.  
 While 2008 should have been a bumper year for Thai rice due to skyrocketing global 
prices, Thai farmers did not benefit as much as expected. In May and June, a new rice price 
crisis began to unfold, as millers failed to buy farmers’ second-season paddy. Banks refused 
to extend credit to millers based on the financial risk involved, leaving farmers with little 
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option but to sell their rice at below market value (Bangkok Post, May 6, 2008). Farmers 
protested and threatened to blockade major highways, calling on the government to reinstate 
the paddy pledging program for the off-season crop (Bangkok Post, June 4, 2008; Bangkok 
Post, June 5, 2008). Prime Minister Samak Sundaravej, Thaksin’s chosen successor, 
responded by again embracing paddy pledging with target prices set above market value 
(Nipon 2010, 207-208). Even after Samak’s dismissal by the constitutional court for 
receiving a token reimbursement for appearing on a morning television cooking program, the 
mortgage scheme persisted. By October, the guaranteed price was at least 2,000 baht/ton over 
market prices, and the government planned to dedicate 97 billion baht to mortgage 
approximately 8 million tons of paddy in the coming season (Secretariat of the Cabinet, 
October 28, 2008).  
 In December 2009, the elected pro-Thaksin government was overturned a second time 
through a judicial coup, and the ironically-named Democrat Party took power with military 
support. Abhisit Vejjajjiva, presiding over a weak coalition, found that his desires to reduce 
paddy prices were constrained. Farmers demanded 13,000 baht/ton of paddy, and the subsidy 
was becoming more expensive for the state (Bangkok Post, March 7, 2009). Abhisit was thus 
faced with a choice of either absorbing the cost or facing farmer protests. In response, he kept 
the paddy mortgage scheme through the 2009 second season crop.  
 As the 2009/2010 harvest approached, though, Abhisit’s government replaced paddy 
pledging with a new insurance program, developed in part with assistance from agricultural 
economists at the Thailand Development Research Institute (interview, former National Rice 
Policy Committee member, October 7, 2015). The new insurance scheme found support from 
both technocrats as well as exporters, as it was designed to subsidize farmers directly rather 
than influence prices (interview, Thai Rice Exporters Association President, October 7, 
2015). In the new program, with a budget of 43 billion baht, farmers would sell their paddy at 
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market value, but the government would guarantee a price for up to 20 tons of rice per 
family. Thus, if the market value of paddy fell below the set price, the government would pay 
the difference to the family for up to 20 tons of paddy. In addition, the government expanded 
direct rice purchases again via the PWO, under the control of Newin Chidchob’s Bhumjai 
Thai party, a vital coalition partner for Abhisit. The PWO was authorized to buy 2 million 
tons of paddy; the government also offered loans to rice millers and farmers to the tune of 60 
billion baht.  
 Farmers were unhappy, though, as rice values dropped dramatically in 2010. Prices, 
which had been well over 10,000 baht/ton threatened to hit 6,000 baht/ton in March. A farmer 
representative threatened, “Farmers from the ten central provinces as well as farmers from the 
North and Northeast and members of the Thai Farmers’ Association will gather at the 
government house in Bangkok together with their farm trucks, tractors, and personal vehicles 
to ask for help from the government” (Bangkok Post, March 7, 2010). Thaksin, now overseas 
avoiding a prison sentence, quickly appealed to farmers. He promised, “If Puea Thai 
[successor to TRT] returns to power, I will support the use of the rice pledging system like 
before” (Bangkok Post, March 10, 2010).  
The dissatisfaction with Abhisit’s rice policies contributed to the growing red shirt 
protests against the government. One farmer explained (Bangkok Post, March 13, 2010):  
I joined the red shirt rally because I want the government to take responsibility for the 
falling price of rice which badly affects rice growers like me. I don’t have any 
political agenda. I’m not loyal to Thaksin or any of his men. All I know is that when 
Thaksin was prime minister, many farmers had better livelihoods and more money to 
spend… I’m sick of this government. They have never paid attention to the plight of 
the farmers and the poor… if the Democrat-led government steps down, the farmers’ 
problems will be solved and our livelihoods will gradually improve. 
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The Democrat Party was unable to convince farmers that the paddy insurance scheme 
provided similar benefits to the paddy pledging scheme. Perhaps even more problematic was 
the loss of support from rice millers and traders. Millers and traders garnered extra money 
from the pledging scheme, as they were paid by the government for both storing and 
processing the rice. The insurance scheme offered no such benefits, and the Commerce 
Ministry was able to convince only 12 out of 1,700 mills to participate in the new program 
(Bangkok Post, April 7, 2010). 
 Plagued by red shirt demonstrations, Abhisit’s government encountered separate 
farmer protests outside the 11th infantry base where he had moved his government due to 
unrest. Demands for greater support of rice prices, though, were met with little response as 
Abhisit ordered a violent crackdown on the red shirt protestors. In the end, 91 people died 
with thousands injured. The brutality of the government response dissuaded farmers from 
protesting through much of the coming year.  
By early 2011, though, farmers were again protesting low prices. The Thai Farmers 
Association threatened to hold a mass rally in Bangkok if the government did not respond to 
farmer demands for higher rice prices. In March, farmers blocked major highways, calling for 
the government to increase its rice guarantee to 14,000 baht/ton as well as expand the 
insurance program to 40 tons/family (Bangkok Post, March 4, 2011). The government 
responded by raising the price slightly as well as expanding the guarantee to 30 tons/family; 
later the government also agreed to directly buy paddy in provinces where prices were 
particularly low. The Democrat Party’s efforts, though, failed to appease farmers. The 
opposition Pheu Thai party needled the Prime Minister on the issue. Abhisit, overestimating 
his popularity, responded by daring Pheu Thai to run their election on a pledge to revoke the 
rice insurance policy and reinstate the paddy pledging scheme (Bangkok Post, March 16, 
2011). 
 31 
 
Pheu Thai, now headed by Thaksin’s younger sister Yingluck, did just as Abhisit had 
challenged. The party campaigned on the promise to return to the paddy pledging scheme and 
offer even higher prices, which contributed to the electoral victory wherein Pheu Thai 
captured 265 of the 500 parliamentary seats. Paddy pledging returned, although due to 
flooding and previous rice hoarding, its effect was not felt by farmers until the end of the 
main season. During the 2011/2012 harvest year farmers pledged 18.61 million tons of rice at 
prices up to 50 percent higher than market value (Table 1). Experts severely criticized the 
scheme, as it reached beyond prior paddy-pledging programs (interview, Nipon 
Poapongsakorn, October 5, 2015). Thaksin, speaking of government policy behind the 
scenes, though, refused to budge, “This policy cannot end. We want farmers who grow the 
rice we eat to survive. They should have their minimum income guaranteed so that they will 
continue to grow rice for us” (Bangkok Post, April 23, 2012). The policy continued to be 
popular among farmers, earning them an estimated 296.5 billion baht of extra profit across 
five cropping seasons (Nipon and Kamphol 2014, 21) before the Pheu Thai government was 
deposed on May 22, 2014. 
Thus the policy environment of the fourth period was much more unsettled than in 
previous eras due to efforts to “force the genie back in the bottle” (Hicken and Selway 2012). 
Initially, the appointed, bureaucrat-led government attempted to return to rice pricing policies 
which had existed prior to 2000. Once Thaksin’s successors came to power, though, they 
reinstated the popular paddy pledging program. After a pair of judicial coups, the Abhisit 
government introduced a new insurance scheme, which compromised between the demands 
of farmers and economic efficiency. Electorally, though, the Shinawatras offered a rejoinder, 
promising even higher prices via their popular paddy support policy. This platform conquered 
the electoral field and was implemented from 2011-2014 with 52.8 million tons of paddy 
being pledged during the five seasons the program was in effect, approximately 51 percent of 
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the paddy grown during that time (Table 1). The policy, combined with the societal changes 
of the previous years, overcame the institutional rules meant to turn back the clock.   
 
Conclusion 
 
The account presented above gives us greater insight into the way in which political 
institutions shape Thai politics. In light of electoral rules, we can better understand why 
politicians prior to Thaksin failed to pursue broad-based rural subsidy programs despite the 
existence of rice price interventions. In essence, politicians targeted politically important 
constituencies. Prior to the 1980s, authoritarian leaders focused on providing cheap domestic 
rice to urban bureaucrats and rice exporters at the same time as garnering government 
revenue. In the 1980s and 1990s, policies were directed toward winning over rice millers, 
stabilizing weak coalitions, and minimizing disruptions from farmer protests. Wide-spread 
rural subsidies were unnecessary to accomplish these goals. The 1997 constitution, though, 
created a different set of incentives for politicians, and they pursued broad constituencies 
with rice price subsidies, mobilizing farmers on a large-scale to vote for their party. The 2007 
attempt to turn back the clock stumbled due to societal changes, and the Pheu Thai party, in 
order to consolidate its influence and overcome the new institutional obstacles, offered even 
more extensive subsidies to win over voters. Political leaders across all four periods used 
their access to state resources to build support from relevant constituencies. As these 
constituencies changed due to shifting electoral institutions, so too did the policy appeals 
embraced by politicians. Thus pairing institutional analysis with a public choice approach 
contributes to our understanding of Thai rice price policies.  
 At the same time, this essay suggests that the power of institutions in shaping political 
behavior has perhaps waned. While the adoption of the block vote system (1979-2000) and 
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the mixed electoral system (2001-2006) both heralded significant changes in the policy 
behavior of politicians, the most recent changes in 2007 had a more constrained effect 
(Hicken and Selway 2012, 77-81). Partisan identities, which had been previously nascent, 
have emerged, and the Thai elite’s attempt to turn back time created a fundamental mismatch 
between Thai society and the newly resurrected old institutions. As Veerayooth and Hewison 
(2016, 381) argue, “all institutions are subject to the dynamics of the deeper power structure 
and struggle that underpins them.” Thus, further attempts to engineer a new Thai political 
society through imposing institutions incompatible with a politicized countryside will likely 
have disastrous consequences.4  
 Theoretically, then, the implication is that the effectiveness of institutional 
engineering is conditioned on the environment in which they are implemented. Public choice 
theory argues that politicians use policy to seek the support of interest groups necessary for 
their political coalition to survive (Grindle and Thomas 1991, 25). If those factions are 
sufficiently coherent and large, then no amount of institutional artistry can dissuade 
politicians from pursuing them; indeed, as Yingluck’s paddy pledging scheme indicates, 
leaders may actually amplify their appeals to overcome institutional impediments. Our 
theoretical claims about the effect of institutions should thus be tempered by a deep 
understanding of societal context. In societies with coherent interest groups, the effect of 
institutions will be bounded.   
 Recognizing such constraints on institutional power, then, we also must acknowledge 
that Thai rural society has changed and is continuing to change in unanticipated ways in 
response to government policy (Somchai 2016; Titipol 2015). Where in the past farmers 
served as a political mass that could be mobilized by policy promises, now they are engaged 
in their own efforts to request resources from the state (Walker 2012; 2015). Politicians may 
have lost their capacity to completely direct farmer demands. This signals that the future of 
 34 
 
Thai politics may not resemble the past, especially since Thailand remains an outlier in 
structural transformation (Klyuev 2015; see also “Thailand’s Delayed Structural 
Transformation,” February 8, 2017, http://www.thaidatapoints.com/project-
updates/thailandsdelayedstructuraltransformation). The country has many more farmers than 
it should at its current level of development, and they are now a politically active force. The 
forces of economic development, though, will continue to press for the painful process of 
agricultural transformation (Timmer 2015, 75-79). Individuals and families must leave lands, 
homes, and ways of life which have endured for generations to confront an uncertain 
existence completely dependent upon income through urban labor. As Thailand’s large 
farming population faces this daunting prospect, we need to better understand how the 
structural transformation will shape politics and how politics will shape the structural 
transformation. The analysis above gives us some hints, but more work remains to be done as 
the future of Thailand rests on the state’s capacity or unwillingness to guide Thai society 
through this process. 
 Finally, the current military junta’s efforts to re-write electoral rules in an attempt to 
return to an era of weak coalitions cobbled together under military leadership is unlikely to 
see long-term success. Rising incomes in the cities continue to challenge the capacity of the 
Thai state to address rural-urban inequality, and the politicized countryside will likely make 
even more demands of politicians. It may become increasingly tempting to offer broad-based 
policies to win over rural Thais. Once subsidies are begun they become politically addictive; 
after years of rice price subsidy abuse, it will be a difficult habit to kick.  
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1 Nipon Poapongsakorn (interview, October 5, 2015) claims that World Bank data exaggerate the number of 
Thai farmers. Klyuev (2015, 23) argues, though, that even using Nipon’s reduced estimates, Thailand still has 
too many farmers for its level of development. Counting Thai farmers, though, is complicated as only a 
relatively small percentage of farmers rely primarily on agriculture for their livelihood (Somchai 2016, 508). To 
better understand what constitutes a Thai farmer today, we can draw on data from the quarterly Labor Force 
Survey showing seasonal fluctuation in agricultural labor. For instance, during the 2014 harvest season, over 13 
million Thais (or 34.1% of the labor force) were involved in agriculture while in the following off-season 
(Quarter 1, 2015), this number dropped to 11.4 million (30.5%) only to jump again to over 13 million (33.9%) 
in the following harvest (Quarter 3, 2015). This seasonal fluctuation, which is especially pronounced for the 
Northeast and Northern regions, indicates that Thai households increasingly rely on off-farm income while still 
maintaining ties to agriculture (see “Thailand’s Delayed Structural Transformation,” February 8, 2017, 
http://www.thaidatapoints.com/project-updates/thailandsdelayedstructuraltransformation). As such, family 
members who work in the informal sector still have strong interests in the agricultural sector, buoying its 
political importance despite decreasing numbers of full-time farmers (Pasuk and Baker 2008, 70-73). It may 
thus be more appropriate to think about Thai farming in terms of households or families rather than individuals.    
2 I found no clear explanation as to why the pledged amount during the second season crop reported by the 
Department of Internal Trade was higher than the amount produced reported by the Office of Agricultural 
Economics, but I suspect this may have been due to heavy flooding in 2011 which delayed harvests in many 
areas resulting in main season crops either missing the deadline or quality requirements to qualify for the main 
season pledging program. 
3 During an interview on the day of his appointment to head the MOF, Niphon Wongtra-ngan claimed that there 
was no conflict of interest in holding both positions as President of the Rice Millers Association and head of the 
MOF, despite millers owing 150 million baht to the MOF (Bangkok Post, February 2, 1993). Niphon would 
later also serve as President of the PWO.  
4 I am indebted to Veerayooth Kanchoochat for raising this point during a discussion at the 2016 Thai Studies 
Symposium at the University of Sydney.  
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